India's strategic hot potato

By S. G. Vombatkere
11 Sep 2010

Willingly or forced by global developments, India got into an uncomfortable strategic embrace with USA and invested heavily in Afghanistan's reconstruction. But as USA is desperately looking for a way out of Afghanistan, India may soon find itself in a difficult situation.

Manmohan Singh is keen to further strengthen Indo-US relations
Exactly nine years ago the world stood aghast at the real-time TV screening of the audacious, coordinated attack on WTC and the Pentagon and trembled when, weeks later, USA invaded Afghanistan in retaliation to what was understood as an Al Qaeda attack masterminded by Osama bin Laden. This was first seen as a knee-jerk reaction to retrieve American pride and prop up USA's international image, but soon enough the world interpreted it as a strategic move to gain a secure foothold in Asia. This interpretation was confirmed when USA subsequently defined it as a Global War on Terror (GWOT) and invaded Iraq to execute “regime change” there.

USA's global strategic interests are by now well-defined, and the shocks delivered to Afghanistan and Iraq have been integrated into the way in which the world views USA. US President Obama's recent commitment of withdrawing US troops from Iraq is nothing but outsourcing warfare and corporatizing conflict, since “combat operations” by troops becomes “stability operations” by US-paid mercenaries operating out of US bases in Iraq to maintain hold on the ground.
Strategic partnership

After 9/11 attack, New Delhi thought that USA had at last become aware of cross-border terrorism of which India had been complaining for years. But Pakistan being the long-time seed-bed for terror attacks against India and then becoming a strategic partner of USA, and that too for GWOT, made New Delhi's complaints somewhat ineffective.

After 2004, New Delhi, under a Congress-led UPA government with known “Americanophiles” at the top of the pile, began to cosy up to the US administration, going so far as to say words to the effect that India loves G. W. Bush.
Thus it came to pass that in Washington in July 2005, Indian PM Manmohan Singh and US President G. W. Bush issued a joint statement on a framework agreement for India-USA civilian nuclear cooperation that came to be known as the 123 Agreement. However, this N-deal was overshadowed by the provisions of the Hyde Act enacted by the US Congress in January 2006, which is an India-specific legislation (titled “Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006“) that visualises India having a foreign policy “congruent with” that of USA, and actively participating in USA’s efforts to implement sanctions against Iran if that country fails to conform to USA’s checks on its acquisition of N-weapons.

While certainly India was not bound by the Hyde Act, it is necessary to understand that the provisions of that legislation were part of USA’s foreign policy to bring as many countries as possible under its influence, if not control, for its global designs. Thus, notwithstanding New Delhi's protestations to the contrary, the 123 Agreement overshadowed by the Hyde Act was in fact nothing less than a strategic convergence between India and USA. Indeed, following this, there have been several army, navy and air force joint exercises between India and USA with the stated aim of enhancing military cooperation and inter-operability.

Locked in a strategic embrace
To emphasize the fact of it being a wide-spectrum strategic tie-up, it needs to be noted that the nuclear framework joint statement was issued on 18 July 2005, and on the same day, the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture (KIA) Agreement was finalized and the KIA Working Group formed. And just two days later, on 20 July 2005, the KIA Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by Indian PM Manmohan Singh and US President G. W. Bush. It is left to conjecture whether India was being railroaded into strategic linkage with USA.

On March 3, 2006, US President G. W. Bush was in New Delhi, and he and PM Manmohan Singh signed the Joint Statement on India-US Strategic Partnership with emphasis on civilian nuclear cooperation, but including KIA. This came to be known as the Indo-US Nuclear Treaty, which raised a furore in Indian politics and nearly caused the UPA government to fall when the Left Parties withdrew their support.

It is not out of place to note that the USA's KIA Board gives official status to US seed and food MNCs like Archer-Daniels-Midland, Monsanto and Walmart since their representatives are US KIA Board members, while the Indian KIA Board has full representation of industrial interests with the sole “representative” of the agricultural sector being Dr. M. S. Swaminathan. The purpose of highlighting this is to show, firstly, that the Indo-US Nuclear Treaty was the trojan horse with the little known and even less debated KIA Agreement (which gives free rein to US MNCs and impacts India's food security) in its belly, and secondly, that the strategic tie-up was carried out with political stealth. Of course, with the MNC-friendly provisions of the nuclear accident liability bill, it is clear that for USA at least, the nuclear deal was meant to resuscitate and hugely benefit moribund US nuclear corporations. In sum, India is locked in a strategic embrace with USA, a fact internationally well recognized.

Presence in Afghanistan
India has ancient and modern cultural and economic ties with Afghanistan. New Delhi's interests in Afghanistan also coincided with undoing Pakistan's influence there, and the US invasion was a convenient excuse to upgrade its “soft power” and regain its former strategic depth. However at present, Indian presence there is opposed by the Taliban and Pakistan because New Delhi supported the 10-year long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which was opposed by CIA-sponsored Taliban trained in Pakistan.
The US occupation of Afghanistan post-9/11 placed Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan in a subordinate position relative to its earlier dominant position following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. This, along with the India-US strategic partnership and USA's happy acceptance of India's role in Afghanistan, led to New Delhi providing monetary aid for Afghanistan and actively assisting in infrastructural construction and re-construction by sending manpower.

It should be clear to any perceptive observer of Afghanistan that the rules of the contemporary “Great Game” imposed by USA in Afghanistan would last only so long as the US military has a presence in that country. Even though New Delhi knew the history of the impossibility of subjugating the fiercely independent tribal people of Afghanistan, as the British and Soviets know at their cost (never mind the cost paid by the Afghanis), the inevitable withdrawal of USA from Afghanistan was apparently not considered when New Delhi jumped into Afghanistan with both feet.

Thus, New Delhi as USA's strategic partner, went ahead to help Afghanistan with monetary investment – while people starve at home and there is no money for education and health, India pledged to invest $1.2 billion, becoming the second largest contributor of funds after USA – and also sent Indians to undertake construction work in the face of attacks by the Taliban. India's Kabul embassy is its largest in the world and India has re-built two previous and opened two new consulates in Afghanistan. All this shows India's level of commitment to “re-build” Afghanistan and maintain an enhanced diplomatic presence; predictably, this has enraged Pakistan.
New Delhi's investment in Afghanistan in construction and re-construction work is considerable. Border Roads engineers and Indian military personnel have been airlifted to construct roads and other infrastructure such as a new Parliament House, erecting power transmission lines and a sub-station to supply Kabul with 24x7 power, building the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram highway, sinking tube wells in 6 provinces, running sanitation projects and medical missions, lighting 100 villages with solar power, and building a dam. In addition, India has given three airbus aircraft to Afghanistan's Ariana airline and offers scholarships for studies in India to young Afghans. All this may add up to cost New Delhi around $1.2 billion – a huge amount considering that India's internal development suffers at least partly due to lack of funds.

The Afghan hot potato
When USA begins to consider withdrawing its military from Afghanistan, it is obvious that Pakistan will strenuously endeavour to regain its former influence, and it follows that India would be forced into a difficult position due to its considerable investment in Afghanistan being at stake. Its position may by similar to a man putting a hot potato into his mouth – he cannot chew or swallow it and he cannot spit it out either; and it burns his mouth. New Delhi appears to have already acquired the hot potato by its involvement in Afghanistan, and may put it “into the mouth” when US troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

To put a finer point on the matter, some questions need to be asked: Will India be able to withstand the combined might of Pakistan, the Taliban and al Qaeda on its own in Afghanistan? Will it be worthwhile to pump Indian troops into Afghanistan at enormous cost in order to “save face” and protect Indian interests in Afghanistan? If so, for how long would India remain committed militarily in Afghanistan and, more importantly, will there be an exit policy? Or will New Delhi pull out of Afghanistan a tad earlier than USA does (at the risk of displeasing its senior strategic partner), and write off its huge investment in Afghanistan as a financial misadventure?

The die is cast; the act is committed. Now only time will tell; but the tale it will tell will surely be an unhappy one. Either way, it will have huge repercussions at home.